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Statement of Professor Samuel Estreicher' 
Before the Commission on the 
Future of Worker-Management Relations 
Panel on Private Dispute Resolution Alternatives 
September 29, 1994 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear again before the 
Commission, this time to address some of the questions in the 
Commission's Fact Finding Report concerning the appropriate 
design of private dispute resolution alternatives. 
My testimony is based on years of teaching and writing in 
the field of labor and employment since joining the NYU faculty 
in 1978; representation of clients of my firm in New York; and 
service on the labor and commercial panels of the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA). In addition, for over a decade, I 
have been a member of the Employment Disputes Committee of the 
Center for Public Resources (CPR), a nonprofit organization 
funded by law firms and corporations to promote ADR. Our 
committee — which is comprised of plaintiff and defendant 
Professor of Law, New York University; Counsel, Cahill 
Gordon & Reindel. Address: New York University School of Law, 
40l Washington Square South, New York, New York 10012-1099; 
telephone (212) 998-6226; facsimile (212) 995-4036. The views 
expressed in this statement are the author's and should not be 
attributed to any organization. 
0*?^ &&& 
^°^M°°° 
representatives — has developed model procedures for the 
mediation and arbitration of employment disputes that may be of 
interest to the Commission.2 (I have brought copies of the CPR 
models as well as my previous writings on the subject of ADR in 
employment disputes3 which I will make available to the 
Commission.) 
Premises 
I start off with the premise that the arbitration of 
employment disputes should be encouraged as an alternative 
mechanism, other than administrative agencies or courts, for 
resolving claims arising under public laws as well as contracts. 
It is an alternative that offers the promise of a less expensive, 
more expeditious, and less draining and divisive remedy. Private 
arbitration will never entirely supplant agency or court 
adjudication. But if properly designed, private arbitration can 
complement public enforcement while satisfying the public-
interest objectives of the various statutes governing the 
employment relationship. 
I recognize that this is a contested premise. Some, 
particularly in the plaintiffs' bar, object to the loss of jury 
trials or the fact that the arbitration approach cannot (and 
2See CPR Legal Program's Model ADR Procedures - ADR in 
Employment Disputes; Model ADR Procedures - Employment 
Termination Dispute Resolution Agreement and Procedure; Company 
Policy Statement - Mediation of Employment Disputes. 
3See Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without 
Unions, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 753 (1992); Unjust Dismissal Laws: 
Some Cautionary Notes, 33 Am.J. Comp. L. 310 (1985). 
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should not) replicate the pretrial discovery procedures available 
in the civil courts or the extensive judicial review of factual 
and legal errors available in the courts of appeals. 
For several reasons, these objections are overstated. 
First, civil litigation resulting in substantial jury awards is 
a realistic option for relatively few claimants under public 
laws. For the overwhelming majority of the claimants, a private 
lawyer cannot be secured and their claims will be addressed, if 
at all, by overworked, understaffed administrative agencies. 
These agencies — after considerable delay — typically offer 
little more than a perfunctory investigation. Second, while 
individuals with substantial claims — often, white senior 
managers with age-discrimination grievances4 — may lose access 
to jury trials, the jury trial is a relatively recent innovation 
in employment law (introduced into Title VII and ADA lawsuits 
only as a result of the Civil Rights Act of 1991). We should not 
view jury trials as a necessary feature of the employment-law 
landscape. Major strides were made in the discrimination field 
for 25 years without resort to juries. Our basic labor laws do 
not provide for jury trials. European countries with wrongful 
dismissal laws rely on specialized labor tribunals, which 
resemble tripartite arbitration boards, not civil jury trials. 
And the federal sector in Canada uses private arbitrators for its 
wrongful dismissal law. Finally, opportunities for discovery and 
*See, e.g., Schuster & Miller, An Empirical Assessment of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 38 Ind. & Lab. Rels. 
Rev. 64 (1984) . 
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somewhat enhanced judicial review can be made part of the 
arbitration process without incurring all of the expense, delay 
and exhaustion of civil litigation. 
From the employer's perspective, jury trials inject an 
element of uncertainty because of the unpredictability of jury 
awards and the risk that, in certain cases, juries will dispense 
their own view of social justice rather than finding facts and 
applying the law in accordance with the court's instructions. 
This uncertainty undermines society's interest in enabling firms 
to make sound personnel decisions and, as the Rand studies5 
suggest, has negative effects on the willingness of firms to hire 
additional workers. In short, we have a system in which some 
individuals in protected classes obtain significant recoveries, 
while others queue up in the administrative agencies and face 
reduced employment opportunities. 
Spurred by these concerns and the pro-arbitration rulings of 
the Supreme Court — most notably, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp.6 — many companies have either adopted or are 
seriously considering plans that provide for arbitration by 
neutrals as the final step of their in-house grievance 
procedures. Not long ago, surveys by David Ewing, Alan Westin 
5See James N. Dertouzos & Lynn A. Karoly, Labor-Market 
Responses to Employer Liability (Rand Instit., R-3989-ICJ, 1992); 
also James N. Dertouzos, Elaine Holland & Patricia Ebener, The 
Legal and Economic Consequences of Wrongful Termination (Rand 
Instit., R-3602-ICJ, 1988). 
<500 V.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991). 
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and others7 found only a handful of companies willing to allow 
third-party arbitrators to have the final say. The trend today 
appears to be in the opposite direction. Companies as diverse as 
Burlington Northern Railroad, Brown & Root, ITT (for headquarters 
employees), Rockwell International (for top management employees) 
have taken this step, and more are likely to follow. 
Need for Legislation 
The Commission, in my view, should recommend legislative 
reform that would encourage mandatory arbitration of public-law 
and contractual claims in both union and nonunion firms. 
Legislation is needed to put mandatory arbitration on a firm 
legal basis. 
l. Uncertainty for Nonunion Firms 
For firms in the nonunion sector, there remains a 
substantial legal question whether the Gilmer decision has 
applicability for employees other than registered representatives 
in the securities industry. The Supreme Court left open the 
reach of the exclusion in §1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
of "contracts of employment, seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers in engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce."g Few other industries are like the securities 
7See, e.g., D. Ewing, Justice on the Job: Resolving 
Grievances in the Nonunion Workplace (1989); A. Westin & A. 
Feliu, Resolving Employment Disputes Without Litigation (1988); 
D. HcCabe, Corporate Nonunion Complaint Procedures and Systems 
(1988); Ichniowski & Levin, Characteristics of Grievance 
Procedures: Evidence from Nonunion, Union, and Double-Breasted 
Businesses, 40 Indus. Rels. Res. Assn. 415 (1988). 
*9 U.S.C. fl. 
5 
industry — governed by self-regulatory organizations that can be 
the source of mutual arbitration promises independent of an 
employment agreement. A number of district courts have read the 
FAA exclusion as limited to workers directly involved in the 
transportation industry.* This interpretation enjoys some 
support in decisions of courts of appeals in the era prior to the 
Supreme Court's Lincoln Mills decision10 that strained to find a 
legal basis to enforce arbitration clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements. Professor Cox at the time thought the 
reading to be an artificial construct because it ignores the 
broader reach of the "any other class of workers in engaged in 
foreign or interstate commerce" clause of §1." 
Companies may be reluctant to adopt arbitration policies 
because, if the Federal Arbitration Act is unavailable, there is 
a considerable risk that mandatory arbitration will not preclude 
a later lawsuit. Moreover, attempts to limit access to the 
company's grievance procedure or to condition benefits on an 
employee's waiver of the right to a judicial forum may be viewed 
9See, e.g., Crawford v. West Jersey Health Systems, 847 
F.Supp. 1232 (D.N.J. 1994); Kropfelder v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 
1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1157 (D.Md. 1994). 
'"Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 
448 (1957). 
"See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 
Harv. L. Rev. 591, 597-98 & n.27 (1954). Competing readings of 
the FAA SI exclusion are evaluated in Estreicher, Arbitration of 
Employment Disputes, supra, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 760-62. 
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as actionable MretaliationM under the discrimination laws.12 
2. Uncertainty for Employees and Other Claimants 
Legal uncertainty also disserves the interests of employees 
and others with claims under the employment laws who lack a firm 
basis for determining what their rights are in private 
arbitration proceedings. It undermines the acceptability of 
arbitral outcomes and may generate litigation that could be 
avoided if the necessary safeguards for private adjudication of 
public-law claims were spelled out. 
3. Additional Hurdles for Union-Represented Firms 
Union-represented firms face even higher obstacles to 
securing mandatory arbitration of public-law claims. This is 
v. 
because the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.13 
held that union representatives cannot waive the right of 
represented employees to insist on a judicial forum to hear their 
EEO claims. Nor can unions agree with employers that resort to 
the contractual grievance machinery constitutes an election of 
remedies barring a later lawsuit. Gilmer reaffirms this 
teaching, and expressly distinguishes between (i) mandatory 
arbitration clauses in agreements with individual employees 
(which are enforceable under the FAA), and (ii) the same clauses 
,2See EEOC v. Board of Governors of State Colleges & Univ. , 
957 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992). 
"415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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in collective bargaining agreements (which are not).14 
The distinction drawn in Gardner-Denver and reaffirmed in 
Gilmer is from one perspective counterintuitive: It holds 
enforceable agreements that may be the product of unequal 
bargaining power, while rendering unenforceable (and possibly 
unlawful) agreements that reflect the preferences of a 
collectively-empowered workforce. Also, the combined effect of 
Gardner-Denver and Gilroer is to artificially raise the costs of 
union representation vis-a-vis the nonunion alternative. By 
denying only firms in the union-represented sector the 
availability of a contractual mechanism for the comprehensive 
resolution of all claims arising out of an employment dispute, 
these decisions place the union-represented firm at a competitive 
disadvantage having nothing to do with the nature of union 
demands or job practices. 
General Principles for Legislative Reform 
New legislation in this area should be guided by four 
general principles: 
1. Legislation in this area should be facilitative. The 
goal of the law should be to make it possible for the 
parties to craft mandatory arbitration agreements that can 
provide a binding, comprehensive resolution of all 
employment claims, under certain safeguards. We should 
avoid, however, insisting on rigid formats. Companies 
differ in their internal personnel practices, employee and 
managerial capability, and work culture. Some companies may 
wish to experiment, for example, with use of mediation or 
,4The Seventh Circuit also has ruled that a provision in a 
labor agreement providing that an employee must choose between 
invoking his contractual remedy or forgoing that remedy and 
repairing to the civil courts amounts to illegal retaliation 
against EEO claimants. See note 12 supra. 
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peer review as a prelude to binding arbitration. Such 
experimentation should be encouraged, but these and similar 
approaches may not be appropriate for all companies. 
2. Tli* availability of mandatory arbitration should not 
turn on the unionised status of the employee. As I hope to 
demonstrate below, safeguards can be provided to minimize 
any potential for conflict of interest between employee and 
union identified by the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver. 
3. Private arbitration agreements cannot waive substantive 
rights under the employment laws. To the extent the 
mandatory arbitration procedure purports to deal with claims 
under public-law statutes, there is a public interest in 
ensuring that substantive judgments embodied in those laws 
are honored in the arbitration process. Or, as the Supreme 
Court put it in Gilmer, employees can waive their right to a 
judicial forum but, absent clear authorization in the 
particular statute, cannot waive their substantive 
entitlements. 
4. Private arbitration is not, and should not be converted 
into, a private form of agency or court adjudication. Some 
change in traditional commercial arbitration is needed to 
enhance the capability of the system to address public-law 
claims in an acceptable manner. We should take care, 
however, to ensure that any additional procedural safeguards 
are truly needed to help arbitration assume these new 
responsibilities. We should always be mindful that 
regulation comes at a price — detracting from the 
traditional advantages of arbitration and possibly 
discouraging its utilization. 
Design of Private Arbitration of Public-Law Claims 
With these general principles in mind, I would like to turn 
to some of the design questions raised by the Commission in its 
Fact Finding Report of May of this year. 
1. Selection of Arbitrator 
In my view, arbitration holds the greatest promise of 
providing an acceptable alternative means of resolving public-law 
claims if both parties jointly select the arbitrator or, failing 
agreement, the selection procedures of a recognized, neutral 
arbitration organization (like the AAA or CPR) are utilized. 
9 
The Court in Gilmer allowed use of securities industry 
arbitration, but it is important to remember that the Court 
specifically left open the question whether its holding extends 
to arbitration promises contained in employment agreements. 
Arbitration always poses the danger that "repeat players" in the 
system will have special influence over arbitrators. This danger 
is aggravated by use of an industry panel (despite recent 
improvements in NYSE panels)15 or roster of arbiters unilaterally 
selected by the employer. 
To meet the concerns raised in Gardner-Denver, employees 
represented by unions should have the same right as 
nonrepresented employees to (i) insist on taking their dispute to 
arbitration and (ii) participate in the selection of the 
arbitrator.1* In most cases, such employees will turn to the 
union for advice and representation. But we should leave open 
the possibility that the employee will have access to independent 
counsel or advisers who could play a useful role in enhancing the 
fairness and acceptability of the system. 
"Securities-industry arbitration procedures are critically 
reviewed in U.S. Govt. General Accounting Off., Employment 
Discrimination - How Registered Representatives Fare in 
Discrimination Disputes (GAO/HEHS-94-17, March 1994). 
,6Labor arbitration of claims arising under collective 
bargaining agreements would remain lawful even in the absence of 
these safeguards, but they would seem essential if the 
arbitration is to have the effect of precluding later suits on 
public-law claims. 
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2. Qualifications of the Arbitrator 
Arbitrators should be lawyers or former judges with 
experience in employment law. I note the draft revision of the 
AAA rules (under consideration by the California region) requires 
that H [arbitrators serving under these Rules be experienced in 
the field of employment law."'7 Appropriate disclosure by 
potential arbiters of prior dealings with the parties or their 
representatives is already a requirement under the current AAA 
rules. Further regulation here is not advised. We can count on 
the self-interest of the private arbitration organizations to be 
keep active only those members of its panels found to be 
acceptable to employer and employee representatives. 
The FMCS and administrative agencies with responsibility 
over the employment laws can also play a very useful role in 
maintaining their own roster of arbiters, and perhaps by the 
force of their moral suasion encouraging the parties to draw 
individuals from that roster. It would be a mistake, however, to 
artificially limit the universe of arbiters to those found 
acceptable to federal or state agencies. Such a requirement 
would discourage resort to arbitration, without adding 
significantly to the quality or neutrality of the arbiters. 
"September 1994 Draft of revised AAA Employment Dispute 
Resolution Rules, §9(a)(i). 
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3 . Arbitration Procedure 
a. Representation 
In order to promote an acceptable process, any arbitration 
of public-law claims should permit employees to be represented by 
counsel of their choosing. Although employees covered by 
collective-bargaining agreements may well choose to be 
represented by their union, they should be permitted to secure 
independent representation. If an employee or former employee 
claimant does not have access to counsel, the employer should be 
permitted, if it so chooses, to provide financial assistance 
(perhaps in the form of an insurance benefit plan for this 
purpose, with appropriate Copayment provisions to deter frivolous 
claims) to permit the claimant to obtain independent counsel. In 
addition, the availability of attorney's fees for "prevailing" 
claimants under the EEO laws should help generate a private bar. 
Financial assistance by the employer should not, however, be 
mandated. Again, the purpose of legislative reform is to promote 
rather than discourage use of private arbitration. But if the 
employee is unable to secure counsel, any arbitration — even 
proceedings where employers agree not to be represented by 
lawyers — should not have the effect of precluding later 
lawsuits. 
b. Discovery 
Some limited prehearing discovery might be available as a 
matter of right, with authorization of additional discovery on a 
showing of special need. The CPR model procedures allow for a 
12 
prehearing exchange of documents, "at least one deposition of an 
Employer representative designated by the Employee," and 
additional discovery of items found by the arbitrator to be 
"relevant and for which each party has a substantial and 
demonstrable need."11 The draft AAA procedures envision an 
"arbitration management conference," at which the arbitrator will 
consider "the resolution of any outstanding discovery disputes 
and establishment of appropriate discovery parameters...."" 
We should, however, resist any effort to transform 
arbitration into a traditional lawsuit — particularly any 
temptation to import the full gamut of discovery devices 
available under, say, the federal rules. Most employment 
disputes involve garden-variety issues concerning the quality of 
the claimant's job performance and the motive of the employer. 
One deposition of an employer representative and transmittal of a 
copy of the claimant's personnel file, coupled with the 
traditional subpoena power of the arbitrator (or the lawyers) 
should suffice for most cases. If there is a special need for 
additional discovery, arbitrators should have the authority to 
consider such requests. 
uCPR's Legal Program, Model ADR Procedures - Employment 
Termination Dispute Resolution Agreement and Procedure, Art. 10. 
"September 1994 Draft of revised AAA Employment Dispute 
Resolution Rules, §6. 
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c. Class Actions 
Should the law require that private arbitration of public-
law claims make provision for class actions to the extent class 
claims are litigable under the statutes in question? There is 
some authority interpreting the FAA and the federal rules in this 
manner.20 The question is a close one. A priori there is no 
reason why simply because certain procedures are available in the 
federal courts they must be imported into private arbitrations. 
Note that states vary in their approaches to class-action 
litigation, and yet a suit in the state courts will preclude a 
later federal suit in the federal courts on the same subject 
matter. Nevertheless, class actions do play an important role in 
EEO litigation. Some claims, involving theories of disparate 
impact and systemic disparate treatment, often can only be 
brought on a class basis. 
Because of the close relationship between this particular 
procedure and substantive entitlements under the employment laws, 
"'The California courts have held that certification of class 
claims in arbitration is proper in appropriate circumstances. 
See Keating v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.3d 584, 613-14, 645 P. 2d 
1192, 1214-18, 183 Cal.Rptr. 360, 377-78 (1982), rev'd in part on 
other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 4 65 U.S. 1 
(1984). Relying on Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3), which provides that 
in arbitration proceedings the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
"apply only to the extent that matters of procedure are not 
[statutorily] provided for," a district court has granted a 
motion to certify a plaintiff class in arbitration proceedings 
involving customer-brokerage disputes over commodities trading. 
See Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., No. 89 C 7148 (N.D. 111., 
June 15, 1990). The related issue of the authority of federal and 
state courts to consolidate related arbitration claims in one 
proceeding is surveyed in Stipanovich, Arbitration and the 
Multiparty Dispute: The Search for Workable Solutions, 72 Iowa L. 
Rev. 473, 490 n.82 (1987). 
14 
private agreements to arbitrate public-law claims should 
authorize class actions in appropriate circumstances — if the 
intent of the parties is to provide a comprehensive resolution of 
all employment claims. Private agreements that do not authorize 
class claims should still be lawful and would preclude litigation 
of claims adjudicated in the arbitration. However, where 
arbiters are not given authority to hear class claims, claimants 
that intend to press such claims should be able to exit from the 
arbitral system. 
4. Arbitration Awards 
a. Written Opinions 
Because private arbitration in this context purports to 
resolve public-law claims, there is a public interest in ensuring 
that awards are at least in broad measure faithful to the 
legislative judgments contained in the laws. This requires, in 
my view, a departure from the traditional practice of commercial 
arbitrators to simply announce results without giving reasons for 
the award. If the award is to preclude a later lawsuit, the 
arbitrator should be required to provide an opinion stating the 
reasons for the decision reached.21 The experience in labor 
arbitrations suggests that a statement-of-reasons requirement 
promotes acceptability of the process, and does not require a 
prolix document. 
2,This is the position taken in the September 1994 Draft 
revision of the AAA Employment Dispute Resolution Rules, §30(b). 
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b. Remedies 
Private arbitration of public-law claims entails a waiver of 
a right to a judicial forum, but should not involve any waiver of 
substantive rights. Accordingly, the arbitrator should be 
authorized to provide the full panoply of remedies available 
under the statutes in question, including injunctive relief, 
attorney's fees and punitive damages27 in appropriate 
circumstances. Again, it should be entirely lawful for the 
parties to exclude certain remedies from the arbitrator's 
authority, but later lawsuits seeking the excluded remedies could 
not be precluded. 
c. Confidentiality 
One of the benefits of private arbitration is that it 
provides a means of resolving a dispute in which reputations and 
good-will can be shielded from public disclosure. Unless there 
is a need to repair to the courts to obtain judicial enforcement 
of an award or to make filings with administrative agencies in 
order to preserve substantive rights, the parties should be free 
to provide for confidentiality. 
Administrative agencies might wish to monitor arbitration 
awards in order to determine whether private arbitration is 
^Some appellate decisions suggest that the FAA implicitly 
confers such authority, even where the agreements contain a 
choice of law clause referring to a jurisdiction that does not 
allow arbitrators to assess punitive damages. See Lee v. Chica, 
983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard 
Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991); Raytheon v. Automated 
Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989); Bonar v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378 (llth Cir. 1988). 
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producing satisfactory outcomes in conformity with the 
substantive requirements of the public law. Litigants (and their 
representatives) might also need to review previous awards of an 
arbiter in order to make an intelligent decision as to the 
arbiter's competence and neutrality. For these reasons, it would 
appropriate to require that awards (redacted to delete 
identifying details) be kept on file with the arbitration 
organization under whose auspices the proceeding was conducted. 
5. Court Review of Awards 
Traditionally, judicial review of arbitration awards in 
commercial cases is limited to questions of bias or other 
misconduct or whether the arbiter exceeded the submission of the 
parties.23 Because private arbitration in this context 
implicates the public interest in enforcing the policies of 
public employment laws, the courts should be authorized to engage 
in a somewhat more demanding scope of review. A possible 
approach is suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc..24 an 
international arbitration pursuant to the FAA involving claims 
under the arbitration laws. Justice Blackmun observed in that 
case: "While the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that 
substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remains 
minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to ascertain that 
the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually 
"See, e.g., FAA SS10-11. 
M473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985). 
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decided them." 
This "minimal" review might not be demanding enough in the 
employment-law context. It would be appropriate to give the 
courts express authorization to review the portion of awards 
resolving public-law employment claims for "manifest disregard" 
of the law.23 However, unless the parties agree otherwise, 
awards should not be reviewable for factual or legal errors on 
the same terms as an adjudication rendered by a trial court or 
administrative agency — lest we undermine the benefits of the 
arbitration process altogether. 
€• Ihe Authority of Administrative Agencies 
Private agreements cannot displace the authority of 
administrative agencies to vindicate public policies committed to 
their charge by the legislature. To the extent agencies have 
authority to mount litigation that is not dependent on the 
charges of private parties, they could continue to do so 
irrespective of the outcomes reached in private arbitrations. 
A difficult questions arises in connection ,with claims under 
the federal employment discrimination laws, where private parties 
are required to file charges with the administrative agencies in 
part in order to give those agencies an opportunity to determine 
MThe "manifest disregard" standard — a judicially-created 
addition to the statutory grounds for vacating an award set forth 
in the FAA — requires a showing that "the arbitrator Understood 
and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it.'" 
Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 19S6) 
(citations omitted). A similarly deferential standard informs 
the NLRB's review of arbitration awards for conformity with the 
policies of the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., 
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1955). 
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whether enforcement objectives warrant a lawsuit by the 
government on behalf of the private parties. Current law 
provides that employees may not waive and employer cannot require 
waiver of the right to file charge with the EEO agencies.24 That 
safeguard should be preserved under any new legal regime because 
it gives the administrative agency an important window of 
opportunity to monitor employer practices (including the fairness 
and integrity of arbitration procedures) and to decide whether to 
file a lawsuit. 
Where the applicable law requires such an administrative 
filing, the employee-claimant should be free to file a charge 
with the agency, and any arbitration would be stayed until the 
agency issues what is called a notice of "right to stie" letter.27 
If the agency decides to bring litigation on the claimant's 
behalf, the existence of an arbitration agreement should not bar 
the agency suit. 
If, however, the employee-claimant decides not to file a 
charge, the sole avenue for redressing the public-law claim will 
be the arbitration, subject to limited judicial review for 
"manifest disregard" of the law or the traditional grounds for 
vacating awards. 
MSee EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 
1085 (5th Cir. 1987); Older Worker Benefits Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 101-433, §201, 104 Stat, at 984 (amending 29 U.S.C. 
5626(f)(4)). 
"Such letters are now a prerequisite to any private lawsuit 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1966. 
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conclusion 
Private arbitration of public-law claims offers the promise 
of a quicker, less expensive, less divisive means of resolving 
employment disputes. Legislation is needed to put private 
arbitration on a firm legal basis, remove impediments in the 
union-represented sector, and to provide safeguards to ensure 
appropriate enforcement of the substantive policies of the public 
laws. This can occur without converting arbitrations into court 
actions. 
20 
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